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1.  Introduction 
Corporate auditors are assigned to review financial statements and evaluate the accuracy of the 
information provided, which is crucial for investors and other stakeholders of a firm. It seems 
obvious that auditors evaluating financial statements should be independent from the firms’ 
management who is providing exactly this information. However, the lack of auditor 
independence is one of the major issues in the recent history of corporate governance. After the 
huge accounting scandals (e.g. Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, Parmalat, etc.),
1 which culminated in the 
collapse of Arthur Andersen, there has been a growing call for tougher corporate governance 
provisions in general and specifically for improved auditor independence. In the United States 
these developments resulted in the ‘Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002’ better known as the ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act’.  
Our main interest lies in provisions requiring the auditor to be appointed independent from 
management and rules calling for mandatory auditor rotation, which compels a company to 
change the audit firm at regular predetermined intervals. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act together with 
other corporate governance rules installed at e.g. the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the NASDAQ require the board committee appointing 
the auditor to be composed entirely of outside directors. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did 
not establish mandatory auditor rotation, it required the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to analyze such procedures (GAO 2003). Mandatory auditor rotation is heavily debated 
among audit experts, academics, policy makers, and management boards. Proponents of 
mandatory auditor rotation argue that long term relationships between auditors and their clients   3 
impede auditor independence. Therefore, auditors should only have limited mandates. Opponents 
of such rotation point out that rotation would make things worse because new auditors need time 
to acquire the relevant information and know-how to effectively audit a firm. They argue that 
audit failures typically occur in the first few years of a mandate.  
It is an empirical question to determine the effect of mandatory auditor rotation. There have been 
only a few systematic empirical attempts to answer this question and most studies encounter 
heavy selection bias, because typically troubled firms change auditors more often than sound 
companies. Furthermore, there seems to be incentives for managers to switch to ‘incompetent’ 
auditors (e.g. auditors new to the industry) the moment problems occur. We argue that it is 
extremely difficult to determine the impact of mandatory auditor rotation by analyzing the 
corporate sector, because endogeneity and selection effects are serious threats to valid inference.  
Therefore, we propose examining the influence of predetermined auditor terms, term length, and 
rotation requirements in the public sector, where the fundamental agency problem is similar, but 
the empirical hurdles are less daunting. In order to obtain useful insights from the public sector, 
we need to analyze the similarities of the agency relationship in the public and the corporate 
sector, and discuss critical issues. Our empirical investigation focuses on the US State level, 
where state auditors are often elected or appointed for a fixed term. We take advantage of the fact 
that auditors are elected or appointed for a different term length or sometimes face term limits. 
We estimate the impact of such differences on Moody’s state credit ratings for US long term state 
bonds. We find evidence of a U-shape relationship indicating that auditor performance is weak 
for very short and very long terms. This is consistent with theories pointing towards audit failure 
due to a lack of expertise in the beginning of a mandate as well as with theories suggesting 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 For an overview of the most significant recent US accounting scandals see Patsuris (2002) at   4 
problems associated with diminishing independence with extended auditor-client relationships. 
Furthermore, our results indicate beneficial effects of term limits, which can be interpreted as 
being in favor of mandatory rotation requirements. 
We propose that auditors should be elected or appointed by either the shareholders or an 
independent board of directors for a fixed term with the possibility of reelecting or reappointing 
the auditor. We advocate a term limit restricting the auditor from serving too long. Such a design 
is related to auditor rotation requirements, but is much more flexible and preserves auditor 
expertise for an extended period of time.  
Section 2 introduces corporate auditors and discusses problems associated with auditor 
independence and auditor tenure. Furthermore, we present the main pros and cons of mandatory 
auditor rotation and review the empirical evidence on corporate auditors. After comparing the 
similarities between the public and the corporate sector, Section 3 introduces the US public 
sector, which we use to conduct the empirical study. The institutional variance across US state 
auditors makes it possible to analyze several issues related to auditor design. In Section 4 we 
present the data and analyze the influence of fixed auditor terms, term length, and mandatory 
rotation requirements in the form of term limits. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
2.  Auditor Independence and Mandatory Auditor Rotation  
The agency problem between the owners and the management of a firm is at the heart of the 
corporate governance literature.
2 The main question is how investors (the principals) can make 
sure that they are not expropriated by the management (the agents). Disclosure requirements, 
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independent review, and legal enforcement are key factors to reduce this principal-agent problem. 
Without accurate and timely information, shareholders, creditors, and any other stakeholder 
groups will find it difficult to make adequate decisions. However, if the management is 
unconstrained and in sole charge of providing information, there is a high risk that this 
information serves management interests and is not necessarily accurate. Therefore, disclosure 
requirements must be backed by independent review and legal rules allowing private litigation in 
the case of non-compliance.
3  
2.1.  Auditor independence 
Review of financial information is usually conducted by independent and certified private 
auditing firms, which are supposed to verify and certify financial statements issued by a 
company’s management. Review by a corporate auditor only reduces the agency problem 
between the investors and the management if collusion of the management and the auditor is not 
likely.
4 A first step towards reducing the risk of collusion is to keep the auditor independent from 
the management, eliminating the most obvious channels for side-payments and reciprocal 
behavior. In order to provide an unbiased and impartial view on financial statements, legal 
provisions usually require that financial reports are audited by some external professional body, 
not directly linked to the company. However, independence is not guaranteed by the requirement 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 Important contributions stretching this view are e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Prendergast (1999), or more recently Bebchuk and Fried (2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Becht, Bolton and 
Röell (2002) provide excellent surveys of the field.  
3 For evidence on the role of disclosure requirements and private litigation see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2006). They examine securities laws that improve transparency, make contracting between firms and 
investors easier, reduce costs of resolving disputes and, thus, encourage financing through equity. They analyze 
disclosure requirements and liability standards in securities laws in a cross-section of countries and find strong 
evidence that disclosure requirements and liability standards promote financial market development. 
4 E.g. Antle (1984), Tirole (1986), Baiman, Evans and Nagarajan (1991), Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), Aghion and 
Tirole (1997), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), and Khalil and Lawarée (2006) analyze the problem that there are 
incentives for the supervisor/monitor (e.g. auditor) to collude with the agent (e.g. management).   6 
that the auditor must come from an outside company. There are numerous additional threats to 
auditor independence, starting with the entanglement of audit and non-audit services provided by 
an accounting firm to the same client, appointing and removal procedures as well as 
psychological ties to the appointing body.  
Audit and non-audit services 
Providing audit and certain non-audit services (e.g. consulting services) to a client at the same 
time has been prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Prior to that prohibition accounting firms 
were able to offer audit services below cost, because lucrative consulting services compensated 
for the incurred losses from audit services (e.g. Levitt 2000). Such entanglement obviously 
impairs independent review of financial statements by the auditing and consulting firm. 
Appointing and removal procedures 
Auditor independence is heavily influenced by the appointing procedure of the corporate auditor 
(e.g. Acemoglu and Gietzmann 1997, Mayhew and Pike 2004). Independence is difficult to 
achieve if the management is appointing the auditor – its own supervisor – or if it has a big stake 
in the (re)appointment process. Permitting the management to appoint its auditor, increases the 
risk of collusions because the appointing process introduces a direct channel for side-payments 
and reciprocal behavior. Even though this risk is well understood, in many companies the top 
management is heavily involved in the appointing process. Even if the CEO does not choose the 
auditor single-handedly, he frequently nominates the corporate auditor, and the board of directors 
can only confirm or reject the CEOs’ choice (although rejection almost never actually happens).    7 
This is an additional reason why the board of directors should be dominated by independent 
outside directors instead of inside directors or the CEO himself.
5 Klein (1998) confirms this view 
and provides evidence that firm performance is positively correlated with the dominance of 
outside directors in the audit and compensation committee. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
together with corporate governance rules imposed by the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the AMEX 
require that the board of directors of companies with stocks listed in the United States be 
composed of a majority of outside directors. They further impose that the audit committee 
consists entirely of outside directors with at least one having financial expertise (Agrawal and 
Chadha 2005).
6  
As important as hiring, is firing. Thus, removal procedures might also influence auditor 
independence. If the management is authorized to change the auditing firm at will, auditors’ 
incentives become aligned with the management and audit services might be biased in favor of 
the agent that is being monitored. If the management is able to influence both hiring and firing, 
the threat to dismiss the auditor can have considerable effects on auditor independence. In the 
extreme case the management actively searches for a ‘friendly’ auditor, which is sometimes 
referred to as ‘audit shopping’ (e.g. Davidson III, Jiraporn and DaDalt 2006). Therefore, a natural 
device to reduce agency problems might be to let investors directly choose the auditor. Mayhew 
and Pike (2004) analyze auditor selection and its influence on auditor independence in an 
experimental framework. They specifically analyze if investor selection of the auditor enhances 
independence. In their experimental framework they are able to manipulate who hires the auditor 
and they measure the influence of the selection mechanism on auditor objectivity. They find 
                                                 
5 On the influence of the composition of the board of directors see e.g. Weisbach (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998), Klein (1998), or Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)   8 
strong evidence for increased objectivity of the audit report if auditors are directly chosen by 
investors. This experimental approach is especially interesting because such a setting does not 
exist in the ‘corporate world’. 
Psychological ties to the appointing body 
Another less discussed threat to auditor independence comes from psychological ties between the 
auditor and the appointing body. Behavioral economists Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore 
(2002) argue that people are vulnerable to unconscious bias in favor of the appointing body. 
“Psychological research shows that our desires powerfully influence the way we interpret 
information, even when we’re trying to be objective and impartial.” (Bazerman, Loewenstein and 
Moore 2002: 98). In a series of experiments they show that individuals evaluate the same facts 
systematically different if tied (e.g. hired) to different bodies. Individuals do not even need to 
have strong ties to some party. In order to observe such bias it is sufficient that they are loosely 
connected (e.g. a hypothetical professional relationship is sufficient). They ran experiments with 
professional auditors asking them to evaluate the accounting of five reports. Half of the group 
where told that they should assume they were hired by the company to be audited and the other 
half should assume they were hired by some different company doing business with the firm 
under audit. Auditors assuming they were hired by the firm under review attested full compliance 
with GAAP with a 30 percent higher probability in all five cases. The authors conclude that “[…] 
even the suggestion of a hypothetical relationship with a client distorts an auditor’s judgments.” 
(Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore 2002: 101). They underline that reforms must target 
auditors’ incentives to please a client. From this perspective they are in favor of the provision of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibiting consulting services to companies under audit. The authors go 
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much further and propose that auditors should be hired for a predetermined period with no 
possibility of rehiring.  
In order to strengthen auditor independence several proposals have been made:  
Auditor election directly by shareholders: One straightforward approach would be to let 
shareholders directly choose the auditor in regular competitive elections at the general assembly 
(e.g. Schelker and Eichenberger 2003, Frey and Benz 2005, Bebchuck 2006, Benz and Frey 
2007, and for experimental evidence e.g. Mayhew and Pike 2004). In order to enhance auditor 
independence the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made some progress by strengthening the board of 
directors and delegating the selection of the corporate auditor to the audit committee, which is 
required to be composed of a majority of outside directors. However, this is by no means 
equivalent to the direct election of the auditor by investors, because directors still have strong 
incentives to please management or at least not openly oppose it.  
Mandatory auditor rotation: Mandatory auditor rotation is a much debated approach to enhance 
independence.
7 Such provisions require companies to change the audit company at regular 
predetermined intervals. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act takes one step in this direction by requiring the 
rotation of the responsible lead partner within an auditing firm. The dispute on this issue among 
auditing experts, academics, and policymakers is indeed contentious. Since there are arguments 
in favor of mandatory auditor ration as well as against it, we will briefly summarize the main 
points of these discussions.  
                                                                                                                                                              
expertise reduce the probability of earnings restatements. 
7 Rotation requirements are also important in other situations in which a monitor is supposed to provide information 
to a principal who himself cannot obtain such information directly. E.g. Hertzberg, Libterti and Paravisini (2007) 
show that a bank policy typically requires some form of rotation of loan officers. They argue that the reassignment of 
loan officers to different borrowers provides incentives to disclose bad information.   10 
2.2.  Mandatory auditor rotation: the main pros and cons 
Mandatory auditor rotation has been debated for years (recent contributions are e.g. Dopuch, 
King and Schwartz 2001, Gietzmann and Sen 2002, Myers, Myers and Omer 2003, Mansi, 
Maxwell and Miller 2004, Comunale and Sexton 2005, and Gosh and Moon 2005). At the core of 
the discussions is the trade-off between improving auditor independence and the associated costs 
of forgoing auditor expertise.  
Proponents of auditor rotation emphasize the positive effects of rotation on auditor independence, 
which reduces agency problems and increases the credibility of financial reports. From this 
perspective mandatory rotation enhances auditor independence because managers cannot directly 
threaten auditors with dismissal and cannot promise future income due to reappointment. Because 
there is no direct link to potential income from future engagements of the auditor by the same 
client, mandatory auditor rotation increases independence.  Furthermore, it is sometimes 
suggested that extended client-auditor relationships alone impede on auditor independence (e.g. 
Mautz and Sharaf 1961). The negative effect of extended auditor tenure stems from evolving ties 
between auditor and client.
8 This argument is underlined by psychological evidence provided by 
Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore (2002), who suggest stronger psychological bias with 
increasing ties between client and auditor. Moreover, ‘low-balling’ is also constrained by rotation 
requirements. ‘Low-balling’ refers to audit firms offering fees that are lower than the marginal 
costs of the initial engagement with a new client. Such an offer is interesting if the audit firm 
                                                 
8 Arel, Brody and Pany (2005: 36) describe the close relationship between Enron employees and the employees of its 
auditor Arthur Andersen: “Andersen auditors and consultants were given permanent office space at Enron 
headquarters here and dressed business-casual like their Enron colleagues. They shared in office birthdays, 
frequented lunchtime parties in a nearby park and weekend fund-raisers for charities. They even went on Enron 
employees’ ski trips to Beaver Creek, Colo.”   11 
anticipates declining marginal costs of future audits if it is rehired (Dopuch, King and Schwartz 
2001). Mandatory rotation would also be an easy fix for such practices.  
Opponents argue that mandatory auditor rotation is not costless. They point out that changing the 
corporate auditor involves a loss of expertise because the new auditor does not know the 
company well and must first acquire the relevant company- and industry-specific know-how. 
This lack of expertise in the beginning of a mandate may lead to information asymmetries 
between auditor and client and increased audit failure. Such failure worsens the agency problem 
and weakens credibility of financial statements. Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) even 
argue that as audit-client relationships endure, auditors become more independent, because due to 
experience and client-specific knowledge, the auditor depends less on management information. 
Furthermore, it is argued that voluntarily changing the auditor contains information. Because 
there are a number of reasons why firing the auditor and engaging a new firm is beneficial to 
shareholders – if the change occurs because the auditor was e.g. not efficient, extremely 
conservative, or qualitatively inferior – the change of an auditor may provide information to the 
market. It could also be that a firm changes from a small audit firm to a big 6 audit firm, which is 
often considered a step towards higher quality audit.
9  
2.3.  Empirical evidence 
Independence seems to be crucial to ensure high audit quality, but so is expertise. It is, therefore, 
an empirical question to determine the effect of mandatory auditor rotation. The main question to 
address is how to preserve or improve independence without too big a loss of expertise. A 
straightforward implication is to let the principal, the investors elect the auditor. This would tie   12 
the auditor more to the investors and less to the management without loosing expertise due to 
mandatory rotation. Mayhew and Pike (2004) show in their experimental setting that investor-
selected auditors indeed remain more independent. However, we still have to consider that over 
time the ties with management might become strong. Therefore, rotation might still be an issue.  
Empirical evidence analyzing the influence of auditor tenure on outcome variables such as audit 
quality perception of investors, market valuation, the likelihood of earnings restatements, etc. 
emerged in recent years. In the empirical settings analyzing real-world data, one major drawback 
is that auditor rotation seems clearly endogenous to firm specific developments and not the result 
of exogenously determined rules such as mandatory auditor rotation. Bearing this in mind, we 
will briefly summarize some main findings of the existing literature.  
At the heart of the mandatory rotation requirement lies the idea that extended auditor-client 
relationships lead to lower audit quality. Therefore, empirical studies focus on the impact of 
auditor tenure on outcome variables. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) report that longer tenure 
results in lower cost of debt financing, measured by S&P credit ratings and credit spreads. 
Furthermore, several recent studies report positive correlations between auditor tenure and real 
and perceived earnings quality (Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds 2002, Myers, Myers and Omer 
2003, Gosh and Moon 2005). These results suggest that longer tenure increases expertise, and 
that the effect of potentially diminishing independence over time is compensated by that effect. 
These findings are consistent with earlier evidence suggesting that most audit failures occur at the 
beginning of a term.  
                                                                                                                                                              
9 For evidence indicating higher audit quality provided by big auditing firms see e.g. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 
(2004), or Davidson III, Jiraporn and DaDalt (2006)   13 
However, if both aspects, expertise and independence, are important one could think of an 
inverse U-shape relationship between audit quality and tenure, where due to learning audit 
quality is first increasing with tenure and after a certain period of time is decreasing because of 
diminishing independence. However, such a quadratic relationship cannot is not captured in the 
standard linear estimation model. There are no empirical studies known to us investigating such a 
quadratic relationship.  
As we have mentioned before, studies on this topic conducted in the corporate sector suffer from 
some potentially important problems. Even though most studies carefully explore the data and try 
to address some sources of endogeneity (notably Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2004) they cannot 
actually analyze auditor tenure in an environment with exogenously, predetermined, auditor 
rotation. If tenure is the main variable of interest we need to keep in mind that auditor tenure is 
determined or heavily influenced by the management under audit. Thus, if auditors are changed, 
the reasons behind the change are unclear and most certainly motivated by firm-specific 
developments and are hence endogenous. E.g. in the most optimistic case the auditor is changed 
because the management would like to have a more competent auditor. However, this suggests 
that the change occurs because auditor performance is weak. In contrast, scenarios in which 
troubled firms switch to incompetent auditors to hide shortcomings from investors could bias 
results in the other direction. In this case increasing audit failure would be wrongfully attributed 
to auditor rotation. The simple fact that managers can influence auditor rotation obstructs valid 
inference.  
The severe endogeneity problems motivate Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2001) to conduct 
empirical research in an experimental setting. They analyze four different treatments: (1) one 
treatment does not require auditor rotation or retention, (2) one requires auditor retention, (3) one   14 
requires rotation only, and (4) one treatment requires both rotation and retention of the auditor. 
They report that rotation requirements in the third (requiring rotation) and forth treatment 
(requiring rotation and retention) impact positively on auditor independence. Church and Zhang 
(2006) address the problem of mandatory auditor rotation theoretically because they also 
acknowledge the severe empirical problems occurring when analyzing this specific problem. 
Similar to the experimental setting they find that mandatory auditor rotation can improve auditor 
independence. However, the results are sensitive “[…] to the rotation period, start-up costs, the 
costs associated with biased reports auditors’ learning, and the time span of managers’ 
incentives.” (Church and Zhang 2006: 3).  
We conclude that the existing empirical evidence on the impact of auditor tenure suggests that 
longer auditor tenure impacts positively on outcome measures. However, the studies suggesting 
this positive relationship between auditor tenure and outcome measures do not take into account 
that the influence of tenure length might follow a non-linear relationship in which auditor 
performance is low in the beginning due to a lack of expertise and also for longer tenure because 
of diminishing auditor independence. Furthermore, there are serious caveats due to selection bias 
and endogeneity that restrict valid inference in the corporate sector. Therefore, we propose to 
learn from evidence in the public sector, in which auditors play as similar role but empirical 
hurdles are less daunting. However, before we present empirical evidence, we need to discuss the 
analogy between the corporate and the public sector.   15 
3.  Auditor Terms and Mandatory Rotation in the Public Sector  
3.1.  Analogies between the corporate and the public sector 
The principal-agent problem is not unique to the corporate sector. By starting their article with 
the statement “Corporations are republics.” Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003: 107) make a 
strong statement highlighting the similarity between the corporate and the public governance 
systems. They continue their view of corporations as shareholder democracies, and write: 
“[…] The ultimate authority rests with voters (shareholders). These voters elect 
representatives (directors) who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats 
(managers). As in any republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends 
upon the specific rules of governance. One extreme, which tilts toward a 
democracy, reserves little power for management and allows shareholders to 
quickly and easily replace directors. The other extreme, which tilts toward a 
dictatorship, reserves extensive power for management and places strong 
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to replace directors.” Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003: 107) 
Hence, the fundamental agency problem shareholders face is the same voters face in a 
democracy. There the agents also have considerable leeway to follow their own interests instead 
of maximizing the principals’ utility. The control problems are extensive in both the corporate 
and the public sector. Both delegate extensive powers to some few agents, whereas the principal 
consists of a large group of individuals facing a collective action problem to control the agents. 
Shareholders as well as voters are both required to take action through the voting mechanism, but 
individuals have only limited incentives to bear information costs and engage in costly actions   16 
against the agent to protect the interest of all other principals as well. Thus, controlling the agents 
requires overcoming the free-rider problem, acquiring information, and orchestrating possible 
countermeasures, such as coordinated voting against decisions taken by the agents, etc.  
Frey and Benz (2005) and Benz and Frey (2007) go beyond the pure resemblance and suggest 
that due to the existing similarities, corporate governance might learn from the rich literature on 
public governance. Agency theory is an important theoretical approach in both corporate and 
public sector economics and there are many institutional similarities. In addition to the ones 
already cited in the beginning (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003), all public entities in developed 
countries are subject to disclosure requirements and independent review by an auditor. Disclosure 
is important because without such transparency the principal has no means of controlling the 
agent. Alt and Lassen (2006) provide evidence for the importance of disclosure requirements in 
the policy making process and show that increased fiscal transparency reduces public deficits and 
debt accumulation. Independent review of financial reports is also an important issue in the 
public sector. Olken (2007) presents evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia suggesting 
that an increase in audit probability reduces wasteful expenditure in the public sector. For the 
same reasons as in the literature on the corporate sector, the scarce literature on public auditing 
focuses much on auditor independence. Without an independent auditor it would be difficult for 
creditors and citizens to assess the quality of financial statements. Thus, auditors are required to 
verify and certify financial statements, which is crucial for credibility. All developed countries 
feature some form of audit institution reviewing financial statements provided by the 
government. In some federal countries such as the US the sub-federal governments, e.g. the states 
or municipalities, feature their own auditing institution. Thus, we believe that – regarding the role   17 
of auditing institutions – the analogy is strong, and analyzing the public sector might provide 
useful insights. However, we need to control for structural differences as carefully as possible. 
3.2.  US state auditors 
In order to analyze the influence of auditor terms and rotation we take advantage of the 
decentralized US federal structure. The US States enjoy a high degree of autonomy and every 
State has its own constitution that defines the primary governance structures and processes. The 
main advantage in this setting is that States feature different regulations concerning the 
institutional details of the state auditing institution. Variation can be observed in many different 
dimensions, notably in the appointing mechanism, the term length, term limits, and removal 
procedures. The main advantage over evidence from the corporate sector stems from the fact that 
auditor terms and term limits are exogenously determined by either the state constitution or state 
law. Hence, the term length or a term limit is not endogenous to actual auditor performance.  
Auditor selection mechanism 
US state auditors are elected by the citizens or appointed by either the legislative or the executive 
branch. Executive appointment is relatively rare and we will exclude these few cases from our 
analysis. In the case of elected or legislative appointed auditors the agent (executive) can neither 
directly select the auditor nor influence it by promising future engagement. This should make 
auditors more independent.
10  
Let us evaluate whether the analogy is instructive for our purposes. Experimental evidence for the 
corporate sector indicates that investor (principal) selection improves auditor performance 
(Mayhew and Pike 2004). In our specific case this would correspond to the direct election of the   18 
auditors by the citizens. Alternatively, the auditor could be selected by the legislature, which 
could somehow correspond to the selection of the auditor by an independent board of directors. 
However, the members of the board of directors are generally not elected in competitive 
elections. From this perspective it seems unclear whether we can directly learn from empirical 
findings in the public sector. Hence, this will not be the focus of our empirical investigation, 
although we will always control for this structural difference.  
Auditor term length and mandatory auditor rotation 
Our main focus of the empirical analysis is on the influence of fixed auditor terms, the length of 
such terms, and mandatory rotation requirements in the form of term limits on public sector 
performance. In contrast to corporate auditors, most US states auditors are not appointed for an 
open mandate, but for a fixed term that varies in length across States. Since it is often argued that 
longer auditor terms impede independence – the main argument for auditor rotation – we analyze 
the influence of different official term lengths on public sector performance.  
Most commonly state laws define a fixed length of term after which the auditor-client 
relationship ends. Some States allow their auditor to reapply for the position and some States 
impose term limits. A term limit is comparable to mandatory auditor rotation, because the auditor 
cannot run for office after the predetermined fixed term is over, irrespective of its performance. 
More strictly speaking, an auditor term limit affects the head of the state auditing office and, 
hence, is comparable to a mandatory change of the lead partner of an audit firm. This is similar to 
the new requirement adopted with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Unfortunately, we cannot study the 
effect of a change of the entire audit apparatus. 
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If the auditor can reapply for the job, but the selection process is open to challengers and not in 
the hands of the audited agent, the mechanism could preserve audit expertise without impeding 
independence too much. Of course it is also important whether the auditor can be dismissed 
during its term. Thus, we do not only analyze official term length but also removal procedures to 
dismiss the auditor. Removal procedures could be a mechanism to keep the auditor in line with 
the interests of the appointing body.  
In the following empirical section we estimate the influence of a fixed auditor term, term length, 
and term limits on auditor performance. We have no clear-cut expectations for the influence of 
longer auditor terms on public sector performance, since there are arguments pointing towards 
inefficiencies due to lower independence as well as towards benefits from more expertise. 
Therefore, we also examine if there are non-linear (quadratic) effects of auditor tenure on 
performance. As we briefly discussed above, it is likely that auditor performance is weak in the 
beginning due to a lack of firm-specific expertise, then increases due to learning, and decreases 
with continuing engagement due to dwindling independence. Hence, we expect a quadratic 
relationship between term length and auditor performance.  
4.  Empirical Evidence on Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation 
from the Public Sector 
In order to conduct our empirical analysis we adopt a dataset that was constructed for the analysis 
of the influence of state auditing institutions on fiscal performance in the US states (see Schelker 
2007).  The dataset contains information on a variety of institutional details of US state auditing 
institutions and a standard set of controls (see also Alt, Lassen and Rose 2006). In addition to the 
information on various characteristics of the US state audit offices, the dataset contains a whole   20 
battery of state specific variables ranging from information on fiscal performance, state 
institutions such as balanced budget requirements, voter initiatives, etc. to population and income 
data. Our panel dataset contains state-specific information between 1990 and 1999. More details 
and summary statistics can be found in the Appendix.  
4.1.  Empirical Strategy 
Remaining close to previous studies in the corporate sector requires dependent variables directly 
reflecting audit quality aspects. Fiscal variables such as expenditures, revenues, deficits, or debt 
seem to be inaccurate, because they themselves depend on audit quality (see Schelker 2007). We 
resort to state long term credit ratings that reflect a market evaluation of state fiscal performance. 
This is comparable to the S&P credit ratings that have been used in the empirical literature on 
corporate auditors (e.g. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2004). In order to tease out the market 
evaluation of anticipated audit quality we have to control for the influence of the reported state of 
public finance and hence, we include real per capita state debt accumulation.  
The data on state credit ratings stem from Moody’s Investor Services. The state general 
obligation bond ratings are available for 39 US States for the entire period 1990-1999, but do not 
include States that have no general obligation debt. The States without a rating are AZ, CO, IA, 
ID, IN, KS, KY, ND, NE, SD and WY. Observing States without general obligation debt ratings 
one should be worried about selection bias. When approaching this potential selection problem, 
we do not find a direct correlation between auditor characteristics and the excluded States. 
Furthermore, we cannot explain this selection with our auditor or institutional variables in a 
regression framework either. Hence, it seems that selection bias is not a major concern in this 
study. Following the general practice for studies analyzing US States we also exclude AK and HI.   21 
Furthermore, we exclude the remaining two States (CA & OR) where the auditor is appointed by 
the executive, which is the main target of the audits. Not excluding these States does not 
substantially impact on our results.
11   
We start by estimating the difference between States defining a fixed term length versus States in 
which the auditor serves at the pleasure of the appointing body (in our case the legislature), and 
the impact of term limits on credit ratings. We then proceed to estimate the influence of term 
length, term length squared, and removal procedures on state credit ratings. It is self-evident that 
we always control for effects stemming from the various auditor selection mechanisms and for 
differences in the mandate to conduct performance audits.
12  
As a first approximation we start by estimating a simple linear model that abstracts from the fact 
that our dependent variable is of ordinal scale. Typically, these linear models are fairly good 
approximations and the interpretation of the effects is straightforward. In a next step we take the 
ordinal scale into account and estimate ordered probit models. The simple OLS and ordered 
probit models assume that the variance of the cross-section specific effects (ai) are zero 
(var(ai)=0). In our setting such an assumption is likely to be violated. In order to relax this 
assumption we estimate random effects models (RE) that assume that the ai’s result from a 
random draw and follow a normal distribution. We conduct Lagrange multiplier tests 
(Breusch/Pagan) which indicate that var(ai)≠0 and hence, the random effects estimates (RE) are 
our preferred specification. Therefore, we only present our random effects estimates (RE) in 
Table 1. Due to the time persistence of our main explanatory variables we cannot further relax the 
                                                 
11 When estimating all specifications including states in which the auditor is appointed by the executive branch, we 
find qualitatively similar or even slightly stronger results. 
12 Not all states require the auditor to conduct exactly the same types of audit. In addition to standard financial audits 
several state auditors also conduct performance audits. Financial audits follow standard accounting rules and are   22 
assumption and estimate fixed effects models allowing for arbitrary correlation between ai and 
the explanatory variables. Given the ordinal scale of our dependent variable and panel structure 
of our dataset our preferred specification is the RE ordered probit model.  
Furthermore, all regressions include variables capturing real per capita state debt, auditor 
selection procedures, and a battery of standard covariates controlling for state specific 
heterogeneity. This is important in order to take structural differences between the States into 
account. First we always present a model that only contains the most standard control variables 
and then present a second specification controlling for a set of additional covariates that have 
proved to be influential in previous studies at the US state level.  
4.2.  Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the results of our regressions on Moody’s state long term obligation bond 
ratings.  
[Table 1 about here] 
When estimating the influence of a predetermined fixed auditor term we do not find any robust 
and statistically significant difference to auditors that serve at the pleasure of the legislature 
(Columns 1-4). Only in the RE ordered probit model not including the full battery of controls 
(Column 3) we find a significant impact. The linear as well as the ordered probit estimates not 
including state random effects only produce insignificant results (not reported). Hence, it seems 
that defining fixed terms per se does not greatly influence outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                                              
comparable across states. The differences in the extent to which performance audits are conducted can be controlled 
for in our empirical model.   23 
The influence of auditor term limits is negative and statistically highly significant in all estimated 
models (Columns 1-16). If a term limit constrains auditor tenure to a maximum of 8 years (2 
consecutive terms of 4 years) we find significantly higher credit ratings. In order to assess the 
magnitude of the effect we can focus on the linear estimates that indicate an increase of the credit 
rating of roughly 0.75 rating categories on average. Such term limits could be interpreted as 
mandatory auditor rotation requirements, because the auditor cannot reapply for the job.  
Because we do not find an influence of a fixed auditor term per se, we refine our specification by 
estimating the influence of auditor term length. We find that the length of the auditor term does 
not have a clear impact on credit ratings. The coefficient is not robust to the inclusion of 
additional control variables (Columns 5-8) and is sensitive to the inclusion of the quadratic term 
(Columns 9-16). As soon as the quadratic term is included we find a consistently positive 
coefficient of our term length variable, which is mostly statistically significant in our preferred 
RE ordered probit models. The positive sign must be interpreted as higher credit ratings for 
longer auditor terms, which is very similar to previous findings in the corporate sector.  
The squared value of auditor term length has a consistently positive impact on credit ratings and 
is statistically significant in most of our preferred RE ordered-probit specifications (Columns 9-
16). The coefficient of the squared term is fairly robust to the inclusion of additional variables 
and tends to be statistically significant if we control for the full battery of relevant covariates. The 
interpretation is that auditors tend to perform weakly for shorter terms as well as for long terms. 
This finding is consistent with the hypotheses that auditors lack expertise when beginning a 
mandate and might become less independent with longer tenure.  
Removal procedures have a negative and significant influence on credit ratings. The easier it is to 
remove the auditor from office the higher are the credit ratings. A potential interpretation is that if   24 
auditors are selected independently from the audited institution, the possibility to be removed 
from office might provide incentives to the auditor to exercise effort. However, we expect easy 
removal to be detrimental if the agency under audit can influence the removal process. We could 
evaluate this effect by estimating an interaction term between removal procedures and executive 
appointment of the auditor. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate such a specification due to an 
insufficient number of relevant observations.  
Typically, we do not find a significant influence of auditor selection procedures in this setting. 
Higher levels of public debt significantly reduce credit ratings, which is exactly what we would 
expect. The other control variables yield consistent results for most of the specifications. Note 
that we do not report marginal effects in the ordered probit specifications, since it is unclear 
which category should be relevant for the interpretation of the results. Therefore, we do not 
attempt to calculate an optimal term length for auditors, given that we find a quadratic 
relationship between credit ratings and auditor term length. This will be the focus of future 
research.  
4.3.  Discussion and implications 
In order to learn from the public sector we have focused on the influence of predetermined 
auditor terms and rotation requirements. We find that a fixed term per se does not have a 
particular influence on government performance measures. However, the term for which an 
auditor is appointed influences auditor performance. We find a quadratic relationship between 
auditor term length and Moody’s state credit ratings. Short auditor terms might reduce auditor 
expertise, while long auditor terms impede independence. Controlling for a quadratic relationship 
we tend to find that generally slightly longer terms are preferred to shorter ones. The strong   25 
evidence on mandatory auditor rotation indicates that auditor rotation could be beneficial. A term 
limit after the second term of 4 years increases credit ratings in most specifications, indicating 
beneficial effects if auditors do not remain in office for too long. 
What can we learn from public sector evidence? 
Most importantly the influence of term limits can be interpreted as mandatory auditor rotation of 
the chief auditor. In the case of corporate auditors, this is comparable to mandatory rotation of the 
lead partner in a firm. We will not draw conclusions about the optimal term length after which an 
auditor rotation requirement should be enacted in the corporate sector. We only note that we find 
effects similar to theoretical and experimental evidence from the corporate sector. We find a 
pattern in the data on term length that is consistent with theories for and against mandatory 
auditor rotation. It seems that indeed auditor performance is lower for short as well as for 
extended terms. This finding is consistent with the main argument of opponents who fear a lack 
of expertise in the beginning and the arguments of proponents who fear a lack of independence in 
extended auditor-client relationships. Since we cannot precisely determine the optimal term 
length, we abstain from making strong recommendations.  
However, if the public and the corporate sector can be compared, the evidence suggests that 
auditor rotation need not be as detrimental as feared by its opponents. A combination of auditor 
rotation requirements with the possibility of reapplying for the assignment for an additional term 
might be an interesting alternative to a mandatory rotation requirement after a first fixed term. 
Such a procedure would make it possible to preserve expertise while providing the flexibility to 
investors or an independent board to replace an incompetent or corruptible auditor. The 
mandatory rotation requirement could then be installed after a second term for example, in order 
to prevent the negative effects of extended auditor-client relationships. It seems essential that the   26 
auditor is evaluated and potentially reappointed by a body not subject to the audits, preferably the 
shareholders themselves, if the board of directors cannot be made entirely independent from 
management. Furthermore, in order to make the appointing process competitive, it should be 
open to all qualified candidates or candidate firms.  
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
Reliable financial information is essential for investors and other stakeholders. Disclosure 
requirements are ineffective if the information provided is not accurate and timely. Therefore, 
disclosure requirements must be backed by independent review and legal rules enabling private 
litigation. Review of financial information is usually conducted by independent and certified 
auditing firms, which are supposed to verify and certify financial statements issued by a 
company’s management. Obviously, if the auditor is not independent from the management, the 
audit of the financial statements looses its credibility. In the wake of the recent corporate scandals 
exactly this problem caused an uproar culminating in the collapse of Arthur Anderson, formerly 
one of the leading global accounting firms. In response to these scandals, corporate governance 
provisions such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act impose tougher rules in order to enhance auditor 
independence. Auditing and consulting services have been separated, the audit and compensation 
committee in the board of directors has been made more independent from management, and 
provisions requiring mandatory auditor rotation have been debated.  
We discuss these provisions and review the available evidence on various aspects of auditor 
independence, mainly auditor selection mechanisms and auditor tenure. Our main focus is on the 
influence of mandatory auditor rotation as a measure to reduce the evolving ties between auditor 
and management over time. The proponents argue that auditor rotation is an important   27 
mechanism to secure auditor independence because the ties between management and auditor 
naturally become closer over time. Opponents in contrast argue that auditing requires firm- and 
industry-specific expertise and that auditor rotation destroys such know-how. They point to 
evidence that audit failure occurs with a higher probability in the beginning of a mandate.  
The empirical evidence on auditor rotation in the corporate sector suffers from serious 
endogeneity problems. If firm auditors are changed, the reasons for doing so are often correlated 
with some performance aspects. Either the auditor is incompetent or it is competent but too 
conservative in the eyes of the management. The latter change is obviously not desirable from an 
investor’s point of view. Thus, observed auditor rotation in the corporate sector is generally not 
exogenous to audit quality.  
Hence, we propose analyzing the public sector in which auditors play a similar role by 
controlling the government agents on behalf of the principal, the citizens. We establish the crucial 
similarities between the corporate and the public sector and discuss our empirical test at the US 
State level. Every US State features a public auditing institution analyzing official financial 
statements. We take advantage of the exogenous variation in the institutional design of these 
auditors across the States. Some state auditors are elected and some are appointed, both typically 
for a predetermined fixed period of time. Some States even feature term limits. We specifically 
focus on the impact of fixed auditor terms, term length, and term limits that are similar to a 
mandatory rotation requirement. In the public sector we can estimate the impact of auditor terms 
and rotation without being too concerned about endogeneity of these characteristics, because they 
are usually determined in the state constitution or state laws and tend to be fairly stable over time.  
We find that the influence of auditor term length and government performance basically follows 
an inverse U-shape relationship. Auditor performance is lower for short as well as for long terms.   28 
This finding is consistent with the arguments brought forward by opponents and proponents of 
auditor rotation. Expertise seems to be important, but extended auditor-client relationships tend to 
impact negatively. Moreover, we find effects pointing towards higher credit ratings in States that 
adopted term limits, indicating that a mandatory rotation requirement after a maximum of two 
consecutive terms of 4 years is beneficial. 
We propose taking the evidence from the public sector into account when evaluating mandatory 
auditor rotation in the corporate sector. Corporate auditors could be appointed for a fixed term 
with the possibility to be reappointed for one additional term. Such a design would be somewhat 
similar to mandatory auditor rotation, but it allows extended auditor-client relationships in order 
to preserve firm-specific expertise, while remaining more flexible and leaving more room in 
order to react to special circumstances.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable description 
Term length 
Term of Office. Code: official term length in years; if the auditor serves ‘at pleasure of legislature, 
legislative committee, etc.’ then coded as 0 
Years of survey: 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Data reconstructed: 1989-2006 
Term limit 
Term limit. Code: 0 if no term limit; 1 if there is a term limit (some states have a limit of 2 terms of 4 
years).  
Years of survey: 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Data reconstructed: 1989-2006 
Remove 
Removal procedure for agency head. Code: 0 if single committee or public official can remove agency 
head, 1 if simple majority vote in both legislative chambers required, 2 if supermajority required in both 
chambers or if special procedures required (e.g. impeachment with supermajority in at least one house, 
or involving judicial branch), 3 if agency head cannot be removed during official term. 
Years of survey: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Data reconstructed: 1990-2006 
Auditor elected 
Selection procedure for office. Possibilities: Elected by the citizens; appointed by the legislature, 
legislative committee, the executive. Code: 1 if elected by the citizens; 0 if appointed.  
Years of survey: 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Data reconstructed: 1989-2006 
Performance audits 
Index adding all 3 types of performance audits: Economy & Efficiency, Program, and Compliance 
audits.  
Economy & efficiency audits 
Economy & Efficiency audit. Code: 1 if economy and efficiency audit is conducted; 0 otherwise  
Program audits 
Program audit. Code: 1 if program audit is conducted; 0 otherwise  
Compliance audits 
Compliance only audit. Code: 1 if compliance audit is conducted; 0 otherwise  
Years of survey: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Data reconstructed: 1991-1993, 1995-1997, 1999-2006 
Notes:  
Main source of data on US state auditing institutions:  
Auditing in the States: A Summary. National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and 
Treasurers (NASACT). 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2002 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006.  
  34 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable  Min. – Max.   Sample mean 
(Std. Dev.)   Description 
Moody’s state credit 
rating   (-1) – (-8)  -2.945 
(-1.598) 
Moody’s state long term obligation rating (highest 
rating Aaa = -1, Aa1 = -2, Aa2 = -3, etc.) 
Fixed term  0/1  0.678 
(0.468) 
If office term length defined (1), if auditor serves at 
pleasure of appointing body (0) 
Term length   0 – 10  3.037 
(2.628)  Office term length of auditor in years  
Term limit   0/1  0.088 
(0.284)  Auditor term limit installed (1), otherwise (0) 
Removal procedures  0 – 3   1.22 
(0.934) 
Index capturing various removal procedures for 
the State auditor.  
Basic controls:      
Auditor elected   0/1  0.353 
(0.478) 
Auditor is elected by the citizens (1), auditor is 
appointed by the legislature (0) 
Performance audits   0 – 3  1.853 
(1.128)  Auditor conducts performance audits  
Government debt  2366.41 – 
23575.21 
5053.18 
(2483.51)  Real per capita government debt in USD 
State Population  550000 – 
2.00E+07 
5343362 
(4622413)  Total state population 
State income  10023.86 – 
22913.7 
14677.58 
(2371.28)  Real per capita state income in USD 
Unemployment 2.7  –  11.3  5.725 
(1.491)  Unemployment rate 
Aged 0.084  –  0.188  0.128 
(0.018)  Fraction of the aged population (65+) 
Kids 0.153  –  0.269  0.187 
(0.018)  Fraction of school-aged population (5-17) 
Additional controls:       
Population density  0.966 – 
1082.702 
210.497 
(257.882)  Population density (population per square mile) 
Divided Government  0/1  0.542 
(0.499) 
Divided Government: either Legislative-Executive 
or Split Legislature 
Balanced budget rule   0/1  0.569 
(0.496)  Balanced budget requirement (no carry-over rule) 
Voter initiative   0/1  0.380 
(0.486)  Voter initiative available (1), otherwise (0) 
Transparency   0.143 – 1  0.524 
(0.184)  Index of state fiscal transparency 
Lame duck governor  0/1  0.258 
(0.438)  Governor in his last official term (lame duck)  35 
Table 1: The effect of auditor term length and term limits on Moody’s state credit ratings 
Moody’s state credit rating 1990 – 1999 (Best Rating Aaa = -1, Aa = -2, etc.) 
Estimation 
Methode  RE RE 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE RE 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Fixed term  0.578 
(0.538) 
0.507 
(0.509) 
1.766 
(0.299)*** 
0.407 
(0.291)  - - - - 
Term limit  0.792 
(0.232)*** 
0.806 
(0.238)*** 
1.105 
(0.363)*** 
1.470 
(0.420)*** 
0.812 
(0.230)*** 
0.816 
(0.235)*** 
2.048 
(0.381)*** 
1.779 
(0.433)*** 
Term  length  - - - -  0.022 
(0.138) 
-0.012 
(0.127) 
0.194 
(0.044)*** 
-0.256 
(0.051)*** 
Basic  controls included included included included included included included included 
Add.  controls  - included - included - included - included 
Year  effects  included included included included included included included included 
Observations  283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
R
2   0.338  0.448 -  - 0.336    0.460 -  - 
Estimation 
Methode  RE RE 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE RE 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
RE- 
ordered 
probit 
  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Term limit  0.770 
(0.231)*** 
0.792 
(0.240)*** 
0.856 
(0.368)** 
1.538 
(0.409)*** 
0.716 
(0.251)*** 
0.746 
(0.256)*** 
1.012 
(0.378)*** 
2.305 
(0.445)*** 
Term length  0.313 
(0.357) 
0.290 
(0.343) 
0.047 
(0.121) 
0.362 
(0.128)*** 
0.521 
(0.379) 
0.476 
(0.348) 
0.383 
(0.124)*** 
0.321 
(0.136)** 
Term length 
squared 
-0.037 
(0.055) 
-0.039 
(0.053) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.051 
(0.014)*** 
-0.048 
(0.053) 
-0.048 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(0.013)*** 
-0.036 
(0.014)** 
Remove    - - - -  -0.633 
(0.394) 
-0.574 
(0.395) 
-1.021 
(0.166)*** 
-1.154 
(0.190)*** 
Basic  controls included included included included included included included included 
Add.  controls  - included - included - included - included 
Year  effects  included included included included included included included included 
Observations  283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
R
2  0.346  0.463 -  - 0.399    0.517 -  - 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Basic Controls: Auditor election, performance 
audits, real per capita state debt, state population, state income per capita, unemployment rate, fraction of aged, 
fraction of school-aged, dummy for southern states. Add. controls: population density, balanced budget requirement, 
voter initiative, transparency, lame duck governor. States with auditors appointed by the executive excluded from 
the regressions. Significance level: * 0.05<p<0.1, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Own calculations 
 